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I. External and Internal Factors Fashioning the Scope 
of Arbitral Authority 
The authority of arbitrators has external and internal limitations 
that have, as a common denominator, the fact that the immediate 
source of arbitral authority is the will of the parties and not 
governmental power.  
Arbitration is limited by external factors because, unlike 
national judges, arbitrators are not part of any government and 
therefore lack imperium to enforce their decisions. Their decisions 
only become effective to the extent that applicable national laws 
and courts lend their support to arbitral determinations and awards. 
In some instances, arbitrators lack the authority to make certain 
decisions. For example, arbitrators may issue provisional measures 
in the form of orders addressed to the parties in the dispute. 
However, unlike national judges, they cannot attach property or 
otherwise issue orders addressed to non-parties like banks or 
public registries. 
Arbitral power is also limited by internal factors because 
although party autonomy is the basis, inter alia, of arbitral 
authority to make procedural determinations, weighing the 
different factors that affect its exercise and limitations is often 
more art than science. Perhaps the most relevant of internal factors 
is that, although vested with a certain degree of authority to 
conduct proceedings and decide administrative matters in the 
absence of the parties¶ agreement,1 when addressing procedural 
 
1 See Article 19, 2012 ICC Arbitration Rules (as amended as of 1 March 2017, 
(³ICC Rules´)) (³[W]he pUoceedingV befoUe Whe aUbiWUal WUibXnal Vhall be 
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matters arbitrators have to persuade (or induce) of their legitimate 
authority, rather than impose it.  
Persuasion, or the ability to induce compliance, is not a given 
and has to be built up step-by-step from the very inception of the 
arbitral procedure. The extent to which an arbitral tribunal can 
induce compliance largely depends on the reasonableness of 
arbitral procedural determinations and the arbitral tribunal¶s 
demeanor during exchanges with the parties. A tribunal will be 
most successful when its members are courteous and firm and are 
able to ensure that each party has been properly heard in 
connection with each procedural determination. The tribunal must 
show the parties that the arbitrators know and have studied the 
record, that arbitral decisions will not be made carelessly or 
irreflexively, and that the parties can rely on the final judgment.  
Another element that contributes to the persuasive nature of 
arbitral procedural determinations, and thus reinforces arbitral 
authority, is conveying to the parties that the arbitral tribunal 
operates as a united team when it addresses procedural matters. 
Showing internal disagreements to the parties and their counsel, 
rather than addressing these disagreements within the four corners 
of the internal interactions among the members of the tribunal, 
undermines arbitral authorit\ and erodes the parties¶ and their 
counsels¶ trust and respect. Of course, this disconnect is more 
dramatic and harmful when one of the members of the arbitral 
tribunal openly takes strong positions (for example, through 
questions during the hearing) favoring the party that appointed him 
or her. At that point harm is done without reaching the level at 
which a party would feel comfortable challenging the arbitrator 
after carefully balancing the resulting disruption of the normal 
course of the arbitration and the risk of alienating the challenged 
arbitrator if the accusation failed. That kind of attitude should 
prompt a private conversation between the president of the arbitral 
 
governed by the Rules and, where the Rules are silent, by any rules which the 
parties or, failing them, the arbitral tribunal may settle on, whether or not 
reference is thereby made to the rules of procedure of a national law to be 
applied Wo Whe aUbiWUaWion´), INT¶L CHAMBER OF COM., 2012 Arbitration Rules 
(effective March 1, 2017), https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-
services/arbitration/rules-of-arbitration/#article_19. 
ARBITRATORS¶ AUTHORITY: SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
 14 
tribunal and the arbitrator, even if that requires pausing the 
hearing. The president should clearly impress on the arbitrator that 
he or she must refrain from such conduct that, if not ended, could 
taint the authority and integrity of the tribunal at large. 
There is also a psychological factor that positively contributes 
to the persuasiveness of arbitral procedural determinations. This 
includes the parties¶ and counsels¶ aZareness that the fate of their 
case is in the hands of the arbitral tribunal and that it would be a 
mistake to alienate the tribunal by observing improper conduct 
during procedure with the intention or potential side effect of 
challenging arbitral authority. Some examples of improper conduct 
include attempting to delay the procedure through baseless 
applications; unjustified requests to extend procedural deadlines, 
requests for the production of documents well after the deadline 
without a show of good cause; multiplying procedural objections 
in the hearing; or trying to create procedural land mines for future 
use to set aside the award.    
In this respect, certain external factors (particularly the laws of 
the seat of the arbitration), combine with the already-described 
internal ones to enhance arbitral authority and concomitantly deter 
parties from resorting to improper tactics. Because of the limited 
means to appeal or set aside arbitral determinations, at least in 
national jurisdictions that are interested in attracting arbitrations, 
parties and counsel know that arbitral decisions will finally settle 
the cases on their merits, leaving very limited chances to attack 
such determinations before a court of law. For this reason, parties 
and their counsel may be inclined not to undermine arbitral 
authority by resorting to procedural tactics that could have a 
boomerang adverse effect on the outcomes of their cases. 
II. Arbitrators¶ CoerciYe PoZers 
In theory, depending on the laws of the jurisdiction of the 
arbitration, the argument could be made that arbitrators may 
impose comminatory sanctions, known as astreintes, to induce a 
party to enforce arbitral procedural determinations. However, even 
if the tribunal had the authority to do so under the applicable law, it 
would most likely lack the authority to enforce the sanctions, 
which would be delegated to a national court of law. Be that as it 
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may, I have never been confronted with a situation requiring 
astreintes or situation where a tribunal was asked to impose 
astreintes.  I do not believe this to be a common occurrence, as that 
type of uncooperative conduct would normally pave the way for 
the arbitral tribunal to draw adverse inferences regarding the case 
of the recalcitrant party.  
Another facet of arbitral authority, in addition to the ability of 
arbitrators to persuade or induce as referred to in Part I, is using 
arbitral powers to police the proceedings.  Such powers cannot be 
equated with those of judges in a court of law. Perhaps the most 
evident power that courts have, and arbitrators lack, is the authority 
to hold a party or counsel in contempt, to impose fines on counsel, 
or even to exclude counsel from a proceeding. However, in an 
exceptional circumstance that arose in a bilateral investment treaty 
arbitration, the arbitral tribunal decided to exclude counsel from 
the case where the presence of the excluded counsel could 
potentially undermine the fairness of the proceedings.2 
Even if it was accepted that arbitrators have the right to 
exclude counsel under the applicable law, arbitration rules, or 
arbitration guidelines, such power would need to be exercised with 
the utmost care and caution, and only to safeguard the integrity and 
fairness of the arbitral procedure.3 
 
2 See HEP v. Slovenia (Hrvatska Elektroprivreda v. Republic of Slovenia), 
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24 (Award) (Dec. 17, 2015), available at: 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C69/DC7132
_En.pdf.  But see, Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/3 (Award) (May 6, 2013). In a later case, the arbitral tribunal took a 
much more cautious approach regarding the same issue, perhaps partly because 
the facts were different and did not justify the exclusion of counsel. 
3 See generally Int¶l B. Ass¶n, Guidelines on Party Representation in 
International Arbitration (2013), available at: 
https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=6F0C57D7-
E7A0-43AF-B76E-714D9FE74D7F; see also, INT¶L CHAMBER OF COM., 2012 
Arbitration Rules (effective March 1, 2017); see also Article 22 (4): Conduct of 
the Arbitration, available at: https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-
services/arbitration/rules-of-arbitration/#article_22. The guidelines apply if so 
agreed by the parties or if after consulting with the parties the arbitral tribunal 
Zishes to rel\ on them ³after having determined that it has the authority to rule 
on matters of Party representation to ensure the integrity and fairness of the 
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The part\¶s freedom to have and maintain counsel of its own 
choice is closely associated with due process since it is part and 
parcel of a part\¶s fundamental right to present and defend its case 
b\ hiring a person Zho enjo\s the part\¶s trust because of their 
personal qualities and professional proficiency. Such right cannot 
be denied or limited except in extreme circumstances in which the 
very principle of due process would suffer because maintaining a 
particular counsel could compromise the integrity of the 
proceedings and work to the detriment of the opposing part\¶s 
rights and legitimate expectations. 
Another area in Zhich the arbitrators¶ authorit\ ma\ be tested 
is within their power to collect evidence. Arbitration rules feature 
open-ended wording that suggest that arbitrators have such power. 
However, in practice they are seldom used and should be exercised 
sparingly.4 It would be one thing to require the incorporation of the 
full text of an incomplete document that was already in the record, 
or of a document that was cross-referenced in another document 
that was already in the record. It would be a different matter for the 
arbitral tribunal to sua sponte launch evidentiary collection to 
establish an arbitral record to satisfy its own investigative 
inclinations.  Arbitrators should be ill-advised to involve 
themselves in such conduct for at least two reasons.  First, by so 
doing the\ are likel\ to advantage one part\¶s case to the detriment 
of the opposing part\¶s case, thus upsetting the apple cart in Za\s 
 
arbitral proceedings.´ Guidelines 5-6 address, precisely, the Hrvatska scenario 
(supra note 2 and corresponding te[t): ³5. Once the Arbitral Tribunal has been 
constituted, a person should not accept representation of a Party in the 
arbitration when a relationship exists between the person and an Arbitrator that 
would create a conflict of interest unless none of the Parties objects after proper 
disclosure. 6. The Arbitral Tribunal may, in case of breach of Guideline 5, take 
measures appropriate to safeguard the integrity of the proceedings, including the 
exclusion of the new Party Representative from participating in all or part of the 
arbitral proceedings.´ Int¶l B. Ass¶n, Guidelines on Party Representation in 
International Arbitration (2013), 
https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=6F0C57D7-
E7A0-43AF-B76E-714D9FE74D7F. 
4 See INT¶L CHAMBER OF COM., 2012 Arbitration Rules (effective March 1, 
2017); Article 25 (1): Establishing the Facts of the Case, 
https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/arbitration/rules-of-
arbitration/#article_25; see also Article 22 (5). 
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contrary to due process and the impartial, independent nature of 
arbitrators. Second, evidentiary measures are usually costly and 
time-consuming, and carried out on the parties¶ dime; thus, 
arbitrators must be very careful not to increase the arbitral 
procedure costs and duration by taking actions that neither party 
asked them to take.  
III. The Arbitral Tribunal¶s Internal Chemistr\: 
Dissenting Opinions 
Finally, another area in which the authority of the arbitral 
tribunal may be at issue is when problems arise with the internal 
chemistry of the members of the arbitral tribunal. This matter has 
already warranted some attention in Part I of this paper. 
Differences of opinion on legal and evidentiary matters among 
the members of an arbitral tribunal are not unusual when 
exchanging views on the complex legal and factual questions that 
usually constitute the subject matter of the disputes at issue. This 
becomes problematic, however, when disagreements transform 
into conduct that is designed to derail the arbitration or favor either 
the setting aside or non-enforcement of the award. Such would be 
the case, for example, if an arbitrator leaked the substance or 
direction of deliberations to the party that appointed them, had ex 
parte communications with his or her appointor, or submitted a 
dissenting opinion to Zeaken the majorit\¶s aZard, Zith the 
intention of exposing it to possible annulment by a court of law on 
appeal. Such actions have been aptl\ characteri]ed as ³arbitral 
terrorism.´5 
There are two different views regarding dissenting opinions. 
The first advocates that dissenting opinions are impermissible 
because they tend to betray the secrecy of deliberations, undermine 
the persuasive value and the binding force of arbitral awards, and 
fail to contribute to the evolution of a non-existent arbitral 
jurisprudence, as  there is no arbitral case law (commercial arbitral 
awards in principle do not become public) or arbitral stare decisis. 
Further, statistics show that, in almost all cases, dissenting 
 
5 Yves Derains, The AUbiWUaWoU¶V DelibeUation, 27 AM. U. INT¶L L. REV. 911, 
918 (2012). 
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opinions are made by the arbitrator chosen by the losing party. 
These statistics could be used to argue that arbitrators are 
invariably partial to the case made by the (losing) party that 
appointed them. 
The second view, which I endorse, takes a more moderate 
approach. This view asserts that not all dissenting opinions belong 
in the same category: there are the good and proper dissents, but 
there are also the bad and ugly. The dissenting opinions that fall 
into the latter are unprincipled in terms of the consideration of 
legal arguments put before the arbitrators and the record of the 
case. Their only purpose or consequence is to weaken the award. 
The dissenter may also be prompted by the desire to signal to the 
party that appointed him or her that she or he sided with and 
staunchl\ defended the appointing part\¶s vieZs Zith the 
expectation of future appointments or as quid pro quo within the 
context of a preexisting relationship. Such dissents find little to no 
support in reasoning that is based on the legal and factual questions 
raised in the dispute. 
The good dissents are those with honest conviction that the 
majority is getting something wrong either on the law, on the facts, 
or on both. Professional integrity in fulfilling the arbitral function 
is at the core of the overarching arbitral mission. An arbitrator¶s 
integrity²and also his or her reputation²suffer when he or she 
begins endorsing awards that the arbitrator considers 
fundamentally wrong on the law or on the facts. In such 
circumstances, particularly when the law is not applied or is 
misapplied by the majority, a dissent is justified and even morally 
required.6  
Finally, in this, as in many other respects, there may be 
numerous reasons why statistics are not convincing. As Mark 
TZain once said: ³[t]here are three kinds of lies: lies, damn lies, 
 
6 Despite the absence of precedential value of commercial arbitration awards, 
the following words of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg still ring true for 
international commercial arbitration: ³[t]o sum up, although I appreciate the 
value of unanimous opinions, I will continue to speak in dissent when important 
matters are at stake.´ Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2010). 
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and statistics.´7 In the area of arbitration, particularly regarding 
dissenting opinions, there is much wisdom in Mark TZain¶s Zords. 
In many instances, statistics are unable to capture the inner 
workings of the arbitral tribunal that may lead to a dissent: from a 
weak or inexperienced president who is led by the nose by an 
astute and partial arbitrator to get to an incorrect or biased decision 
and thus prompting a dissent by the other arbitrator; to an 
opinionated president who has a pre- and ill-conceived vision of 
the case, which is promptly endorsed by one of the arbitrators who 
immediately sees that the party that appointed him or her will have 
the upper hand. Either one of these situations, as well as a 
multitude of others not outlined here, leave the other arbitrator no 
option but to dissent. These are just examples of possible scenarios 
justifying a dissenting opinion that are not captured by statistics.    
 
7 Gary Martin, The Meaning and Origin of the Expression: There are Three 
Kinds of Lies: Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics, The Phrase Finder, 
https://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/lies-damned-lies-and-statistics.html. (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2019). 
